Non-Market Valuation of Open Space and Other Amenities Associated with Retention of Lands in Agricultural Use by Beasley, Steven D. et al.
Non-Market Valuation of Open Space 
And Other Amenities Associated with 
Retention of lands in Agricultural Use 
The Matanuska-Susitna Valley of 
Southcentral Alaska - A Case Study 
., Steven D. Beasley William G. Workman 
l i 
and 
Nancy A. Williams 
Agricultural and Forestry Experiment Station 
School of Agriculture and Land Resources Management 
University of Alaska-Fairbanks 
James V. Drew, Dean and Director 
Bulletin 71 February 1 986 
Nonmarket Valuation of Open Space 
And Other Amenities Associated with 
Retention of Lands in Agricultural Use 
The Matanuska-Susitna Valley of 
Southcentral Alaska - A Case Study 
Steven D. Beasley 
Instructor, Economics 
Department of Economics 
William G. Workman 
Associate Professor, Economics 
Agricultural and Forestry Experiment Station 
and 
Department of Econom:cs 
and 
Nancy A. Williams 
Assistant Professor, Economics 
Department of Economics 
Agricultural and Forestry Experiment Station 
School of Agriculture and Land Resources Management 
University of Alaska-Fairbanks 
James V. Drew. Dean and Director 
Bulletin 71 February 1986 
Table of Contents 
Summary ............... ... . .. .. . .. . . . .. . . .. ..... . . . 
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 
Related Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 
The Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 
Benefit-Cost Analysis and the Pareto Criterion . . . . . . . . . . 8 
Nonmarket Valuation of Collective Goods: 
The Theoretical Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 
The Empirical Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 
Survey Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 
Questionnaire Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 
Field Application of Survey Instrument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 
Results ...... . .. .. .. .. .............................. 24 
Estimation of Aggregate Benefits of Farmland-
Associated Amenities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 
Discussion and Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 
Literature Cited . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 
Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 
Questionnaire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 
ii 
Figures 
Figure 1. Collective optimization of the quantity of public 
good provided . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 
Figure 2. The total value curve for increments and decrements 
in the level of provision , Q, of a service for an individual 
who initially enjoys the level Q 0 and the income yo. . . . . 11 
Figure 3. Hicks ian compensating measures of value for 
changes in Q. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 
Figure 4 . 1-'icksian equivalent measures of value for changes in Q. 15 
Figure 5 . Estimation of aggregate benefits WTPB-A. . . . . . . . 27 
Figure 6 . Estimation of aggregate benefits WTPc-A ........ 28 
Tables 
Table I. Regression results for linear and semi-
logarithmic functions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 
Table 2 . Net present value of open space retention . . . . . . . . . 3 1 
iii 
Springer Loop Road, Matanuska-Susitna Borough. Photograph 
by Steven Beasley, 1983. 
iv 
Summary 
The most productive farmland in southcentral Alaska is currently 
under intense development pressure due to rapid population increases 
and consequential increases in demand for suburban housing. This 
study utilizes a contingent valuation iterative bidding game to estimate 
the willingness of Matanuska-Susitna Borough residents to pay to 
preserve open space and other historical/environmental amenities 
associated with farming activities. Determinants of consumer behavior 
are addressed as well as total benefits and costs of various posited 
development scenarios . This information may be useful to 
policymakers assessing actions designed to purchase development 
rights from Matanuska-Susitna fanners. 
Introduction 
The conversion of farmland to residential sites or to other 
nonagricultural uses is a significant public-policy issue in many regions 
of the United States and other parts of the world. In response to public 
concern primarily motivated by problems associated with the spatial 
pattern of urbanization, state and local governments have been enact-
ing programs to control farmland conversion for some twenty-five 
years (Fisher 1981) . 
In southcentral Alaska, rapid urbanization of the Matanuska-Susitna 
Valley (approximately forty-five miles northwest of Anchorage) closely 
parallels the urbanization trends experienced in the rest of the coun-
try. Between 1975 and 1983, Matanuska-Susitna Borough officials 
estimate that 8000 acres of Class ll and ill farmlands were subdivid-
ed for residential housing purposes (Thurlow 1983 1). Public outcry 
over what is perceived as significant losses of prime farmland during 
the past two decades has resulted in state and local actions to slow 
this conversion. 
There are several factors that have fueled the demand for farmland 
conversion , most of which stem from population growth and the con-
sequential increased demand for affordable housing. First, the ex-
pansion of the city of Anchorage is geographically constrained by such 
natural barriers as the Chugach Mountains to the north and the Knik 
and Turnagain Arms of Cook Inlet in all other directions. The poten-
tial for additional single-family, detached residential housing on large 
lots is nearly exhausted in Anchorage; hence, the prices of these houses 
have skyrocketed over the last decade (Planning, Inc. 1983). The 
Matanuska Valley, on the other hand , has ample growing space, is 
1Thurlow, Gary. Matanuska-Susitna Borough Manager. Palmer, Alaska. Per-
sonal communication. May 1983. 
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a relatively short commute to Anchorage, and has substantially cheaper 
housing prices. This area is fast earning the title of "bedroom com-
munity" of Anchorage. 
Significant changes in the surrounding rural environment have 
resulted from increased rates of population growth and accelerated 
levels of housing starts in the borough; the population doubled be-
tween 1980 and 1984 (Thurlow 1984). While large quantities of wood-
ed and other nonagricultural building sites exist in the Matanuska 
Valley, many builders and home buyers alike have demonstrated a 
preference for the cleared and, often, more convenient locations 
associated with converted farmland. Construction activity in general 
is viewed favorably in the borough due to the associated effects on 
economic prosperity. The same cannot be said of the residential hous-
ing development which has been occurring on farmland within the 
community? 
Some of this development activity is occurring in the Old Colony 
and Homestead areas. These areas have been under continuous cultiva-
tion since the early part of this century, and the farms there are con-
sidered the "showcase" of Alaska agriculture, having significant 
historic and tourist appeal. What has been described as the loss of 
the "heart of agriculture in Alaska" accompanied by degradation in 
the unique scenic beauty of these areas has caused public concern. 
In response to this concern, several public-policy tools have been 
devised to create incentives for farmers to continue farming, thereby 
slowing farmland conversion. Use-value assessments, agricultural 
restrictions, and purchase of development rights (PDR) are examples. 
During the 1984 Alaska legislative session, bills were introduced in 
each chamber to implement a voluntary program whereby the state 
would purchase nonagricultural development rights on farmland, i.e., 
a program that would retain land in agricultural uses. 
The purpose of this study was to attempt to value the collective 
nonmarket benefits associated with farming activities in the Old Colony 
and Homestead areas of the Matanuska-Susitna Borough . Employ-
2This study's survey responses, for example, indicate that 91 per cent of 
respondents favor continued housing development within the borough, 
whereas 98 per cent are opposed to this development on agricultural lands. 
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ing contingent valuation methods (CVM), individual perceptions of 
value for farm-land-associated amenities were measured and linked 
to causal factors through regression techniques. In addition, estimates 
of aggregate benefits derived from this study were combined with cost 
figures from previous work to assess the net social value of efforts 
to retain these farmlands. 
RELATED LITERATURE 
Several major contributions to a definition and a derivation of social 
value are of vital importance in understanding CVM in the context 
of benefit-cost analysis. The initial contributions by Marshall (1930) 
can be interpreted as defming social value within the willingness-to-
pay framework. Consumer's surplus is defined as the difference bet-
ween the maximum value of the consumption bundle to the consumer 
and the amount which a consumer actually paid for it. Hicks (1943) 
subsequently argued that there were actually four measures of con-
sumer's welfare: compensating variation, compensating surplus, 
equivalent variation, and equivalent surplus. He also showed that the 
four measures may differ. The Hicksian surpluses differ from the varia-
tions in that the latter are calculated after the consumer has made 
optimizing adjustments in his consumption set in response to price 
changes while the former do not permit such adjustments. Benefit-
cost analysis often d~als with situations in which optimizing ad-
justments are not possible once the quantity of a public good has been 
set, i.e., an individual must take this bundle as given. Individual valua-
tions in such a context can be viewed correctly as Hicksian surplus 
measures. 
Bradford (1970) recognized such distinctions and presented a 
theoretical framework for the net valuation of public goods. He sug-
gested that traditional Marshallian demand curves are inappropriate 
in welfare analyses of changes in public goods. Instead of respon-
ding to parametric price per unit and thereby choosing an appropriate 
number of units, an individual arrives directly at a total value to himself 
of various given packages of the good. Bradford proposed the con-
cept of an aggregate bid curve for a public good which is the summa-
tion of individual bids (Hicksian surpluses) over the relevant popula-
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tion. The aggregate bid curve is simply an aggregate benefit curve, 
reflecting what an accurate benefit-cost analysis would measure as 
benefits. 
Brookshire et al. (1980) recognized the need for further develop-
ment of the basic Bradford model to be applicable to all classes of 
goods: divisible and indivisible in production and/or consumption, 
both exclusive and nonexclusive in nature. The total value model they 
present is particularly useful in CVM in addressing such topics as 
improvements in aesthetics, which, by their very nature, are more 
in the realm of qualitative rather than quantitative changes. 
In his analysis of the demand for outdoor recreation in the Maine 
woods, Davis ( 1963) pioneered the empirical use of iterative bidding 
games. Davis recognized that, without market prices, efforts to derive 
recreational benefits for benefit-cost analysis were stymied. He sug-
gested interviewing recreators to derive maximum willingness to pay 
for recreational services. These responses would then form the basis 
of an estimated demand curve for the services in the area as well as 
its aggregate value. 
Randall et al. (1974) used contingent valuation to estimate empirical-
ly the Bradford aggregate bid curve for aesthetic benefits of the abate-
ment of environmental damage from air pollution. This study 
influenced the analytical framework for virtually all subsequent CVM 
studies. Their Four Corners study focused on the design of survey 
instruments and explored alternative instruments to elicit bids (pay-
ment vehicles). No tests for bias were performed; however, warn-
ings concerning the credibility of survey design in a hypothetical situa-
tion were emphasized. 
Cognizant of the historical criticism of direct-questioning methods 
to reveal preferences (see, e.g., Samuelson 1954), Randall and others 
suggested further empirical investigation into a range of biases which 
include: 1) strategic, 2) information, 3) instrument related, and 4) 
hypothetical. Currently there is no general consensus among 
economists concerning the relative importance of the various biases. 
Rowe and Chestnut (1983) as well as Mitchell and Carson (1981) 
suggest they are an important problem in CVM studies, whereas 
Schulze et a!. ( 1981) discount their practical significance. 
Desvousges et a!. (1983) recommend that considerable attention 
be given the design phase of the survey questionnaire as a means of 
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reducing the potential for hypothetical bias . Randall et al. (1974) 
outline the necessary prerequisites for successful application of CVM: 
(1) the nonmarket commodity must be familiar to respondents; 2) the 
payment vehicle must involve routinized behavior; 3) the hypothetical 
situation posited should be understandable and reasonable. 
Mitchell and Carson (1983) suggest that a well-defmed hypothetical 
experiment in which the Randall et al. (1974) prerequisites have been 
met not only will reduce hypothetical bias, but all other biases as 
well . This would seem consistent with an earlier assertion by Rowe 
and Chestnut ( 1983) that hypothetical bias may induce other forms 
of CVM bias. 
In conclusion , there remains some uncertainty in the literature con-
cerning the reliability of CVM to measure nonmarket valuations of 
collective goods. While the potential for bias certainly exists in im-
proper application of this method, many researchers believe that careful 
design of the survey instrument circumvents these problems. As 
Schulze et al. (1981) point out, in many situations CVM is the only 
feasible method for measuring nonmarket values. Faced with the alter-
native of total ignorance of such values, "some information is cer-
tainly better than none." 
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The Theory 
The open space and environmental amenities associated with ur-
ban fringe farmlands are unpriced collective or public goods. Such 
goods have two distinguishing characteristics : 1) the difficulty of ex-
cluding the consumer who does not pay for the good (i.e. , nonex-
clusiveness) , and 2) that consumption by one consumer does not reduce 
the quantity available to others (i.e. , nonrivalry) (Mishan 1969). These 
qualities make it difficult for market transactions to result systematical-
ly in socially efficient amounts of the collective good. First, on the 
supply side, the nonrivalry characteristic suggests that the cost of mak-
ing the good available to an additional beneficiary is zero. This means 
that the socially efficient price for the good is also zero, and at a zero 
price no farmer-businessman would be willing to invest in supplying 
the good. On the demand side, since no one can be excluded from 
consumption, whether or not one pays for the good, individuals have 
no incentive to reveal their true willingness to pay for the good, and 
an individual can , as a free rider, still benefit from its presence. 
Alaska has a great abundance of open space and related environmen-
taj amenities to offer its residents and visitors. However, since market 
signals are absent with regard to the production of these collective 
goods, there is little evidence available as to how much these amenities 
are worth . It seems reasonable, however, that the highest marginal 
value would be placed on these benefits in situations in which they 
are in short supply (Gardner 1977). In relatively urbanized areas, 
these benefits may take on a high value indeed. The importance of 
the environmental effects of agricultural land preservation is reflected 
in the criteria used in choosing among qualified parcels in a recently 
proposed Matanuska-Susitna Borough development rights purchase 
program. These criteria include: 1) agricultural productivity, 2) suscep-
tibility to conversion, and 3) contribution to the attractiveness of the 
area. Based on these considerations and the associated historical at-
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traction of the area to tourists, the Old Colony and Homestead lands 
have been singled out for preservation (Thurlow 19833). 
But what is the value of preserving the amenity benefits of these 
agricultural lands? If public expenditures are to be made in this ef-
fort, some notion of the return on this investment would certainly 
be helpful to policy makers. 
BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS AND THE PARETO CRITERION 
One of the most important concepts used in assessing the com-
prehensive benefits and costs of a proposed policy change is the Pareto 
principle, which states that the change is desirable if it makes at least 
one person better off without making anyone worse off (Pareto 1927). 
In practice, however, it is highly unlikely to have any change within 
a society without anyone feeling that he is worse off. This has led 
to the development of the benefit-cost criterion for deciding if a change 
is desirable. The criterion, quite simply stated, is given the existing 
distribution of income, wealth, and property rights, if total benefits 
exceed total costs, a potential Pareto improvement exists. Potential 
means that conditions exist for gainers to compensate the losers in 
such a manner that no one would be worse off (Kaldor 1939). Whether 
or not compensation should be made is generally argued to be an 
equity question, and is therefore not part of the economic efficiency 
considerations.4 
It is within this benefit-cost framework that social value is defined 
and measured . The essential features of this framework can be sum-
marized as follows: 
3Thurlow, Gary. Matanuska-Susitna Borough Manager. Palmer, Alaska. Per-
sonal communication. May 1983. 
41t is interesting to note that , in the case of the proposed development rights 
purchase program, such equity questions have been explicitly taken into ac-
count. Those farmers who would lose their right to develop their property 
for nonagricultural use-the losers-would be paid the fair market value of 




NPV= ~ (B,-C,) / (1 +r), 
t=O 
where: 
NPV is the net present value of the proposed policy 
change 
B, represents the benefits in period t associated with 
the policy change 
(1) 
C, represents the costs in period t associated with the 
policy change 
r is the discount rate 
N is the number of years benefits and/or costs are ex-
pected to flow from the policy change 
Assuming a full accounting of both benefits and costs, a positive 
N P Vindicates a potential Pareto improvement. Implicit in the deriva-
tion of N P Vis the ability to quantify all benefits and costs in a stan-
dardized unit such as dollars. In the present study, costs are based 
on a hypothetical market for development rights . The benefits fall 
into the unpriced collective realm (i .e. , open space and environmen-
tal/historical amenities) and were considered unmeasureable until quite 
recently. 
NONMARKET VALUATION OF COLLECTIVE GOODS: 
THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
A useful theoretical framework for the valuation of collective goods 
is that of Bradford ( 1970) who presents concepts of individual and 
aggregate bid curves for valuation of public/collective goods. The in-
dividual curves reflect trade-offs between increments of the good and 
reduced quantities of a numeraire such as money income. Thus, these 
individual bid curves are nothing more than indifference curves passing 
through a given initial state. The aggregate bid curve is derived by 
vertically summing the individual bids over the relevant population. 
This summation of bids measures the benefits associated with the 









Marginal Aggregate Bid 
Quantity of Public Good 
Figure 1. Collective optimization of the quantity of public good provided. 
Adapted from Randall, et al. 1974, Figure 1, p . 133. 
tity of the public good is that amount associated with maximum ex-
cess of aggregate bid over total cost of provision (fig. 1). Alternative-
ly, the socially efficient amount of the collective good exists when 
the total amount bid and the supply costs are equal at the margin. 
Brookshire et al. (1980) have extended the Bradford model in their 
development of a general framework for the valuation of natural-
resource service flows. This latter framework adopts Hicksian (Hicks 
1943) concepts of consumer surplus in the measurement of benefits 
associated with all classes of goods including nonexclusive collec-
tive goods. Following Brookshire et al. (1980), let us consider an 
individual whose utility level (U) depends on his/her endowment of 
the Hicksian 'all other goods' numeraire (Y) and the availability of 
services produced by a collective good (Q). We may summarize this 
relationship as 
U= U(Q, Y) (2) 
For example, at the origin (Q 0, Y 0 ) in Figure 2, the individual is 
at a level of welfare that defines his/her 'status quo' position. To the 
right of the origin, the level of provision of the service to the individual 












Figure 2. The total value curve for increments and decrements in the level 
of provision, Q, of a service for an individual who initially enjoys th e level 
Q!' and the income Y0 . Adapted from Randall and Stoll 1980. 
movement up the income axis indicates a decrease in income, while 
a movement down the axis indicates an increase in income. The total 
value, or bid , curve is of positive slope, given that the good is a utility-
yielding commodity and the individual is not satiated in the range 
under consideration. For decreases in Q from the status quo posi-
tion, the total value or indifference curve lies in the southwest quadrant; 
for increase in Q, it lies in the northeast quadrant. If it is possible 
to define the quantity of the good in unidimensional , cardinal terms, 
the assumption of diminishing marginal rates of commodity substitu-
tion is sufficient to ensure the curvature shown. If 'quantity' is 
multidimensional, or if it cannot be defined accurately in cardinal 
terms , no a priori assumption can be made concerning the curvature 
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of the total value curve (Bradford 1970) . This may very well be the 
case in this study, where open space and environmental/historical 
amenities take on attributes more in the realm of qualitative rather 
than quantitative changes. 
Recalling that , in the Bradford model , the individual's total value 
curve is an indifference curve pass ing through a given initial state , 
we can write 
(3) 
where the plus and minus superscripts reflect increments and 
decrements of the commodity, respectively. If our individual 's initial 
state is defined by the combination (Q 0, Y 0) , then the difference 
(Y 0 - y-) is the individual's maximum willingness to pay (WTP) for 
the increment (Q + -Q 0) of services from the collective good . Alter-
natively, in order to agree to the decrement (Q 0 - Q-) in Q, our in-
dividual must receive compensation of at least (f+- Y 0) of the 
numeraire. This latter amount is frequently referred to as the minimum 
willingness to accept (WTA) compensation. Employing WTP and 
WT A concepts we may restate equation (3) as: 
Implicit in the discussion above is the assumption that our individual 
has the right to his/her initial welfare position with the combination 
(Q 0, Y 0). It then follows that, in order to gain an increment in Q, 
he/she must make a payment (of Y). Likewise, if asked to reduce 
his/her consumption of Q, he/she is in a position to demand com-
pensation. From this perspective, the WTP and WTA concepts are 
Hicksian (Hicks 1943) compensating measures of value for changes 
in Q. These measures are shown graphically in Figure 3. 
It is useful , particularly in reference to the specific problem that 
is the topic of the study reported here, to consider an alternative view 
of the individual's rights. Suppose that our individual does not have 
legal claim to his/her initial position so that, in order to avoid a decre-
ment in Q, he/she must be prepared to make a payment. Under this 
arrangement, the measure of value of the change (reduction) in the 




U(Qo, yo)=U(Q-. y•)=U(Q•, r-) 




=U(Q-, Y0 +WTA)=U(Q•, Y0 -WTP) 
WTA=Y•-yo 
WTP=Y0 -Y-
Figure 3. Hicksian compensating measures of value for changes in Q. 
Adapted from Randall and Stoll, 1980. 
interpreted as a Hicksian equivalent measure of value. Likewise, in 
valuing an increment in Q, given this new perspective, we would be 
interested in the individual's WT A to forgo such a benefit. These rela-
tionships can be summarized as follows: 
U(QO, yo) ::5 U(Q•, yo)= U(Q 0 , Y 0 + WTA c), for WTA c ~ 0 (6) 
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where the superscript E refers to the Hicksian equivalent measures. 
These welfare changes are shown in Figure 4. In contrast to the con-
cepts underlying equation (4) in which the individual's welfare is held 
constant by compensating changes in the numeraire as the level 
of Q is adjusted, in equations (5) and (6) we examine the adjustments 
in the numeraire that would have the equivalent effect on the in-
dividual's utility as would a change in the quantity of the collective 
good. 
The expected relationship between WTP and WT A for a given 
change in a particular good has been examined in detail by Willig 
(1976) and by Randall and Stoll (1980). Except in those situations 
in which the change has a significant effect on the wealth of the affect-
ed parties, the difference between WTP and WT A measures is ex-
pected to be small.5 
sResults of recent experiments conducted by Knetsch et al. (1983) cast some 
doubt on this conclusion. Apparently, the intrinsic value that some consumers 
may place on ownership of a good can lead to WT A measures that greatly 
exceed theoretical expectations. With regard to the empirical divergence bet-
ween the WTP and WT A compensation measures, this phenomenon should 
not influence the results of this study. Since property rights are assumed 
not to lie with survey respondents, WTP measures are employed. This 
eliminates the need to consider possible problems due to discrepancies bet-








U(QO, YO)~U(Q-, YO)=U(QO, yo_WTP) 
For (Yo_r-)=WTP~O 
U(Qo, yo):;; U(Q•, yo)=U(Qo , yo+ WTA) 
For (Y.-Y0)=WTA ~O 
Figure 4. Hicksian equivalent measures of value for changes in Q. Adapted 
from Randall and Stoll, 1980. 
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The Empirical Model 
The objective of this study is to determine both the magnitude and 
the determinants of benefits stemming from open space and en-
vironmental/historical values of urban fringe farmland in Alaska. The 
structure of the empirical model to achieve this goal must satisfy the 
theoretical framework outlined in the previous chapter. In develop-
ing the empirical model , a perspective consistent with equation (5) 
was adopted. That is, the appropriate measure of value is the in-
dividual's WTP to avoid a decline in open space and environ-
mental/historical amenities. Local residents of the Matanuska-Susitna 
Borough currently have little or no control over loss of these benefits. 
As local farmland continues to be subdivided for housing/commer-
cial purposes, there are significant changes in the nature of the local 
surroundings. Since property rights , i.e., the right to decide whether 
or not to subdivide farmland , are vested with a few local farmers , 
the value of open space amenities accruing to other individuals are 
appropriately viewed as a measure of willingness to pay. As such, 
these benefits are interpreted as Hicksian equivalent surpluses. 
Following the work of a similar study on farmland preservation in 
central Massachusetts (Foster et al. 1982) , two levels of housing 
development on local farmlands were hypothesized and depicted to 
survey respondents in sets of color photographs. The empirical model 
was designed to account for variations in an individual's willingness 
to pay to avoid such changes. The general form of the cross-sectional 
model is: 
WTPj=J(LOC, HEAD, KOP, SEX, LOR, LED, AGE, INC, WEV) (7) 
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where: 
WTPj = annual willingness to pay by the jth household 
for the prevention of a given level of residen-
tial/commercial housing development on specified 
agricultural lands . (It is assumed in this study that a 
respondent is able to determine the willingness to 
pay of all household members .) 
LOC = 0-1 dummy variable identifying the respondent's 
community of residence (1 =Wasilla area , 0 
Palmer area.) 
HEAD= 0-1 dummy variable identifying a head of household 
respondent (1 =head of household , 0 = nonhead of 
household .) 
KOP = 0-1 dummy variable identifying respondents having 
previous knowledge of proposed governmental pro-
grams to purchase development rights on 
agricultural lands (1 = previous knowledge, 0 = no 
previous knowledge.) 
SEX= 0-1 dummy variable to indicate sex of respondent 
(0 = female , 1 = male.) 
LOR = respondent's years of residence in the study area . 
LED = respondent's years of formal education . 
AGE = respondent's age in years. 
INC = respondent's annual household income in 1000 
dollars. 
LDEV = 0-1 dummy variable indicating hypothesized level of 
housing development on local farmlands [0 = the 
hypothesized change depicted by photograph set B 
(low development situation) from photograph set A 
(no development situation) , 1 = the hypothesized 
change depicted by photographic set C (high 
development situation) from photographic set A]. 
This study utilized ordinary least squares ( 0 LS) regression with 
the intent of explaining the variation in the bids through the indepen-
dent variables. While some of the variables in this model were in-
17 
eluded on the grounds of theoretical expectations e.g. , level of hous-
ing development (LDEV) and household income (INC), there are 
no strong a priori expectations regarding the effect that the remain-
ing socioeconomic variables (S/E) might have on WTP. The choice 
of particular socioeconomic variables was based on previous CVM 
studies in which such fuctors have proven useful for explaining variation 
in an individual's valuations (e.g., see Foster et al. 1982, Desvousges 
et al. 1983, Daubert and Young 1981) .6 
As already mentioned, LDEV is a variable representing 
hypothesized changes in the level of housing development occuring 
on local farmlands in the areas in question. As such, LDEV is in-
versely related to the collective good (Q) in equation (5). That is, 
the more heavily the posited development of local farmlands, the less 
open space and environmental/historical amenities remaining on the 
specified furmlands. Again, assuming that the amenities (Q) are utility-
yielding commodities and the individual is not satiated in the range 
under consideration, it is expected that WTP to avoid loss of such 
benefits will be an increasing function of the level of housing develop-
ment on local farmlands, i.e., LD E V. 
If the collective good could be described in continuous, unidimen-
sional, and cardinal terms, this relationship could be expressed 
mathematically as a WTP I a LD E V > 0, and diminishing marginal 
rates of commodity substitution between the numeraire and LD E V 
would ensure a2 WTP I a LD E V 2 < 0, i.e. , a downward-sloping, 
marginal WTP function. However, as mentioned in the last section, 
in the case of a multidimensional commodity such as open space and 
6lnterestingly, researchers in the field of landscape planning have also found 
background variables significant. Socioeconomic factors as sex, age, educa-
tion, length of residence explain as much as 49 per cent of the variance in 
studies measuring scenic valuations (e.g., see Zube et al. 1974, Sonnenfeld 
1966). It makes intuitive sense that the S/E variables may be important in 
determining the shape of the indifference map, therefore the WTP or bid 
function. The general theoretical model, equation (2), developed in the last 
section, however, incorporates only Y and Q. Therefore, it is of little help 
in understanding the relationships between S/E variables and the valuations 
expressed by respondents. Instead, this part of the study must be considered 
exploratory in its attempt to evaluate whether bids are systematic or random . 
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environmental/historical amenities, nothing can be said a priori about 
the expected curvature of the WTP or bid function. Although the WTP 
function remains an increasing function of LD E V (i.e . , 
a WTP I aLDEV > 0), the marginal WTP or bid function may be up-
ward, horizontal, or downward sloping (i.e. , a2 WT PI a LD E V 2 ~ 0) , 
e.g., see Daubert and Young (1981). 
Given the multidimensional and noncontinuous nature of the 
amenities in this study, it seems more reasonable to approach such 
qualitative changes by the use of a discrete dummy variable. Therefore, 
as individual respondents are shown increasing levels of housing 
development on local farmlands , it is expected that WTP to avoid 
such changes will increase, i.e. , tJ.WTPI!lLDEV>O. 
Following consumer demand theory, changes in an individual's in-
come is expected to have the same systematic effect on WTP depend-
ing on the nature of the good in question . In this study it is hypothesized 
that open space and environmental/historical amenities are normal 
goods; therefore, it is expected that respondents with higher levels 
of income will display a measurable tendency to bid more than those 
with lower incomes, ceteris paribus. Mathematically, this can be 
expressed as a WTPI a INC> 0. 
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Survey Procedure 
A bidding game contingent valuation technique was employed in 
collecting data on an individual's willingness to pay for open space 
and environmental/historical amenities in the Matanuska-Susitna Valley 
of southcentral Alaska. CVM was considered a more flexible tool 
for this study since there are a number of problematic constraints im-
posed by the use of other nonmarket valuation methodologies. Bid-
ding games are a direct approach to estimating Bradford's (1970) ag-
gregate bid curve and , furthermore , can be used to address potential 
future situations involving environmental changes. This latter advan-
tage of CVM is particularly relevant to the present study. 
Questionnaire Design 
The questionnaire design followed that of Randall et al. (1974) in 
its attempt to present a credible hypothetical situation to respondents . 
The first part of the instrument consisted of a short text explaining 
the purpose of the survey and an introduction to the general topic 
of shifting land uses at the urban fringe (see Appendix). This was 
followed by some factual information including maps relating to quan-
tity, locations and other characteristics of farmland in the local area . 
This was considered especially important so that the individual bids 
or valuations asked for later in the interview would be specific to the 
local situation and not refer to some general state or national trend 
in agricultural land conversion. Since the specified farmlands were 
well dispersed throughout the geographic areas in which the 
respondents reside, these residents were acquainted with the men-
tioned areas and seemed to have little difficulty conceptualizing the 
farmland to which their valuations were addressed . 
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The next part of the interview process presented the interviewee 
with a series of color photographs depicting potential levels of hous-
ing development for existing agricultural lands in the local area (see 
Appendix). Photographs associated with Scenario A represented the 
status quo or no development for the land remaining in the Old Col-
ony and Homestead farms in the Palmer and Wasilla areas. Scenario 
B depicted moderate levels of housing development in photographs 
showing a landscape with a mixture of housing and farmland. Final-
ly, Scenario C showed a landscape dominated by housing develop-
ment with no farmland visible in the photographs. 
Using Situation A as a reference point in each bidding game, the 
respondent was asked a series of questions designed to reveal his/her 
maximum willingness to pay annually to prevent the development 
scenario first in Situation B (i.e., WTP B-A), and then in Situation 
C (i.e., WTP C-A) for the remaining farmland acreage in the Old 
Colony and Homestead areas. 
In order to lend credibility to these hypothetical valuations, some 
tangible method of payment had to be used in the survey administra-
tion. Respondents were given a choice of three payment vehicles: l) 
an increase in local sales tax, 2) an increase in property taxes, or 
3) a voluntary contribution to a special local farmland preservation 
fund. By allowing respondents the freedom to choose among pay-
ment methods, it was presumed that there would be less likelihood 
of a refusal to bid due to an aversion to a particular mode of pay-
ment. Since many Alaskans seem to harbor strong anti-big govern-
ment sentiments, the option of a nontaxation mode of payment was 
deemed particularly appropriate for this study. 
The interviewer started the bids at $25 per year and asked respon-
dents whether their household would be willing to pay that amount 
to prevent the development scenario under consideration. A yes 
response resulted in the bid's being raised by $25 increments until 
the interviewee answered "no." At this point the amount was lowered 
in increments of $5 until, again, a "yes" resulted. This final amount 
was interpreted as WTP. 
Some of the respondents indicated that they would pay nothing to 
prevent one or both development scenarios from occurring. Research-
ers in previous bidding game studies have queried such respondents 
with follow-up questions to ascertain the motivation for such responses 
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(e.g., see Randall et al. 1974, Brookshire eta!. 1976, Desvousges 
et al. 1983) . For those respondents indicating that the amenities have 
no value, the response is typically recorded as a true zero bid. 
However, for those interviewees objecting to, say, the method of pay-
ment or to the idea of having to pay for amenities that they believe 
are already rightfully theirs, the typical procedure is to label such 
responses as 'protest' bids and to omit these data from the analysis. 
Similar procedures were adopted for this study. However, the criteria 
for identification of protest bids were expanded to account for sen-
timents unique to the Alaskan situation. For example, when 
respondents in this study were asked to explain their motivations in 
refusing to bid, three basic answers were prevalent: 1) annoyance with 
governmental intervention in private land markets; 2) annoyance with 
increased taxation; 3) annoyance with the equity implications of 
governmental programs that benefit selected groups of local residents, 
i.e., farmland owners. Adopting such expanded criteria for this study, 
approximately 20 per cent of the sample were categorized as protest 
bids and eliminated from the analysis. 
FIELD APPLICATION OF SURVEY INSTRUMENT 
The initial effort of this study focused on the benefits that accrue 
to individuals living in communities in close proximity to the specified 
agricultural lands. The reasoning behind this was twofold. 1) As 
previously mentioned, a successful application of CVM, i.e. , where 
the potential pitfalls of hypothetical valuation are avoided, requires 
fulfillment of the Randall et al . (1974) criteria. In so doing, respondents 
should have a clear understanding of the nature of the collective good(s) 
in question. Intuitively, it makes sense that those individuals who have 
daily contact with these farmland-associated amenities would have 
a clearer understanding of the inherent value of these goods than would 
individuals with only occasional contact (for a similar discussion in 
reference to air quality in Los Angeles, see Brookshire et a!. 1982). 
2) It would be interesting to address the valuations of residents of 
more urbanized communities for these amenities, say, inhabitants of 
Anchorage and Fairbanks. However, these efforts would have con-
tributed significantly to the time and expense of this study. Given the 
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budgeting constraints of this initial effort, this is left for future 
investigation. 
Over a period of approximately four weeks during the summer of 
1983, some 153 randomly selected households in the Palmer, Wasilla, 
and outlying areas of the Matanuska-Susitna Valley were surveyed. 
Given the relatively homogenous nature of the population 
characteristics withi.'1 t'"le region (Kr~se 7), 2 geogr:1p~ically str:1tified 
sampling plan was implemented based upon Matanuska-Susitna 
Borough census data (Matanuska-Susitna Borough Census 1983). Cen-
sus information indicated the number of households within several 
geographic subregions, and we used this information to assign a 
representative percentage of the total number of interviews to each 
particular subregion. A random selection process was devised in order 
to ensure that each household within a subregion had an equal chance 
of being selected for an interview. 
The interview was designed to be brief, (the average interview lasted 
only 15 minutes), and this brevity was indicated to the respondents 
before the initiation of the interview. In doing so it was expected that 
the boredom or fatigue factor-hence, a potential for bias-involved 
with many more time-consuming surveys would be reduced . Conse-
quently, response rates were found to be quite high-95 per cent of 
those individuals who were at home agreed to be interviewed. Follow-
up interviews were attempted in cases where initial contact failed. 
7Kruse, J. Professor, Survey Research, Institute of Social and Economic 
Research, Anchorage, AK. Personal communication. June, 1983. 
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Results 
The model relating WTP to casual factors, equation (7) , was 
estimated by applying 0 LS techniques to 119 survey responses. 
Multicollinearity between some of the independent variables was 
detected by high correlation coefficients (i.e., between head of 
household and sex) . As econometric theory suggests, eliminating one 
of these variables from the model improved the t-statistics without 
significant loss of explanatory power (Theil 1971). 
Both linear and semi-log formulations of the WTP function were 
estimated. The results of these regressions are presented in Table 1. 
F-tests were performed separately on each model specification to deter-
mine overall goodness of fit. Specifications of both models are 
statistically significant at the 1 per cent level. Given these results and 
the statistical significance achieved by most of the individual 
regressors, it appears that bids offered by survey respondents are 
systematically linked to the casual factors and are not merely ran-
dom noise. 
Individual regressor coefficients in the linear model are particularly 
useful for direct interpretation of the partial effects of the casual fac-
tors on the dependent variable (WTP). Looking first at LDEV, we 
hypothesized that a respondent household's willingness to pay to 
preserve farmland-associated amenities is directly related to the severi-
ty of the amenity loss. LD E Vis statistically significant in both models 
at the 1 per cent level (table 1) . Additionally, the linear model predicts 
that a household would be willing to pay $70.75 more per year to 
prevent the high-development scenario (WTP c-A) than it would expend 
f0!' ~!'~'.'~!'.~!0!'. 0f !h':' mnrlPro:.tP-rlPvP:Io!'lmP:nt <;cenario (WTP B-A ), 
ceteris paribus. By comparison, WTPB-A values ranged from zero 
to $760 with a mean of $62 per household annually. Bids to avoid 
conditions associated with development scenario C 
(WTPc-A), varied from zero to $1000 with an average of $119. 
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2 t-ratio significant at .20 
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Following the theoretical considerations presented earlier, income 
was expected to weigh positively on WTP indicating that amenities 
in question were normal goods. Referring again to Table 1, we find 
that in both models the regression coefficients of the income variable 
are statistically insignificant. This indicates that the income variable 
has little or no systematic effect on the WTP of surveyed households. 
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Hence, open space and environmental/historical amenities in this study 
should be considered income-neutral goods . 
As mentioned earlier, with the exception of LD E V and INC, there 
were no strong a priori expectations regarding the signs of the 
regressors . The inclusion of the socioeconomic variables should be 
considered exploratory in nature. Referring to the linear model in Table 
1, we see that head of household (HEAD) and previous knowledge 
of a development rights purchase program (K 0 P) are both statistically 
significant at the 1 per cent level. Recalling that these variables are 
0-1 dummys, head-of-household status (vis-a-vis a non-head) and 
previous knowledge of development rights purchase program (vis-a-
vis lack of knowledge) will increase the household's predicted WTP 
by $63.74 and $92.94 , respectively. Interestingly, KOP-i.e., some 
previous knowledge of state and/or local efforts to slow agricultural 
land conversion-was the most powerful variable (followed by LDEV) 
as shown by an analysis of variance. 
Again, focusing on the results of the linear model , we see that 
residential location (L 0 C) and age of respondent (AGE) are 
statistically significant at the 20 per cent and 10 per cent levels, respec-
tively. LOC is a 0-1 dummy variable, and those households located 
in areas contiguous to the city of Wasilla are predicted to be willing 
to pay $40.63 less than those households located in the Palmer areas, 
ceteris paribus. This makes intuitive sense since more of the large, 
scenically appealing farms are located in the Palmer area. Finally, 
the age of respondents and household's WTP are found to be inversely 
related. The linear regression coefficient predicts for every five-year 
increment in age of a respondent, the household's WTP for farm-
land amenities decreases by $1 .99. Explanations of this phenomena 
must be viewed as purely speculative. Perhaps older individuals an-
ticipate a shorter stream of lifetime benefits accruing from farmland 
preservation efforts. Hence, a rational consumer would pay no more 
for the amenities than the value of what he/she expected to consume. 
Several variables were excluded from the fmal model specification. 
As mentioned previously, SEX was eliminated due to multicollinearity 
with head of household (HEAD). Length of residence (LOR) and 
level of education (LED) were eliminated due to their nonessential 
role in the theoretical model and the insignificance of the resulting 
t-ratios. 
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ESTIMATION OF AGGREGATE BENEFITS OF FARMLAND-
AssOCIATED AMENITIES 
Given the sampling procedure, the results of this study can be viewed 
as representative of the types of valuation expected from Matanuska-
Susitna Borough residents in general. Estimation of the annual amenity 
benefits accruing to borough residents from the retention of the 
designated farmlands in agriculture were obtained by aggregating the 
individual bids in the sample and extrapolating these results to the 
area population. This estimation procedure is facilitated by use of 
cumulative demand curves (Martin et al. 1980), one of which has 








WTP= 1501.16 CUM-· 90111 
78 
Cumulative Number 
Of Positive Bidders 
(CUM) 
Aggregate Benefits= E [Maximum Bid+ Area R] 
70 
= E[760+ l WTP d CUM] 
70 
= 1:[8933]=$625,586 
Figure 5. Estimation of Aggregate Benefits WTP8 _A 
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and WTP B-A figure 6). A cumulative demand curve is useful for ad-
dressing consumer surplus issues when valuations are based on 'aU-
or-nothing' provisions of a particular good. Such is the case in this 
study. The demand curve is formed by successively lowering annual 
household WTP to determine the number of bidders who would be 
willing to pay at least that particular value for the amenity provision . 
For each bidding scenario, benefits to sample respondents is the in-
tegral of the respective cumulative demand curve for that particular 
situation . Since this study's sample is approximately one-seventieth 
of the total number of borough households, we can extrapolate the 








WTP=29i6.96 CUM- 91182 
Aggregate Benefits= E [Maximum Bid+ Area R] 
119 
Cumulative Number 





= Erls343]=$1 ,284,ooo 
Figure 6. Estimation of Aggregate Benefits WTP C-A 
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Figures 5 <: no 6 show these calculations, the results of which were 
$625.586 per year .md $1.284 million per year, respectively, for ag-
gregate w:-pB-r and WTP c ..... 
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Discussion and Conclusion 
Previous work by Workman et al. ( 1979) estimated the potential 
cost of a state-sponsored program for purchase of development rights 
on Alaska's agricultural lands. The estimated cost, in 1978 prices, 
of purchasing these rights on farmlands located in roughly the same 
area as that addressed in the current study was $15.165 million. In-
dexed to reflect current price levels, this figure would now be ap-
proximately $20.25 million. In addition, the earlier study estimated 
that such a program would involve administrative costs of $80,000 
annually. 
Combining the results of the current study and Workman et al. 
( 1979) , one can evaluate the net benefits of an effort to retain the 
amenities associated with the Old Colony and Homestead farmlands. 
Only the benefit estimates associated with avoiding development 
Scenario C (high development) need be considered since a program 
that would prevent Scenario B would also prevent Scenario C. Given 
that the strongest sentiments (as reflected by mean bid) were in 
response to Scenario C , these benefits should be used in conjunction 
with the program costs . 
Treating the aggregate bid estimates (less administrative costs) as 
a measure of annual benefits that would flow in perpetuity, the net 
present value (N P V) of the development rights purchase investment 
can be calculated for various discount rates. These results are presented 
in Table 2. These NPVs range from $100.02 million at 1 per cent 
discount rate to $-. 183 million calculated at 6 per cent discount rate. 
Net present value per acre is shown in the second row of this table. 
The internal rate of return (that discount rate that results in an NP V 
equal to zero) was calculated to be 5. 94 per cent. It is not uncom-
mon for public agencies to use discount rates ranging from 4 to 7 
per cent. Within this range, positive N P Vs are obtained . In addi-
tion, real rates of return on the Alaska Permanent Fund investments 
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Table 2. Net present value of open space retention. 
Discount Rate (%) 
Value 2 3 4 5 6 
Net Present Value 
($ million) 100.2 39 .95 19.88 9.85 3 .83 -. 183 
Net Present Value 
per farmland acre 
($) 14305 5705 2738 1405 545 -29 
from 1982 to 1984 have ranged from 4.73 to 7.67 per cent 
(Alaska Permanent Fund Corp. 1984) . Hence, the internal rate of 
return in this study is comparable within this time frame. 
This study should be viewed as an initial effort to value nonmarket 
amenities associated with funning activities and, hence, several caveats 
and suggested directions for further inquiry can be offered. First, it 
is recognized that individuals other than local area residents may 
benefit from the retention of these amenities. Since both in-state and 
out-of-state tourists spend time and money to travel through this historic 
and scenic agricultural area, future studies could employ travel cost 
and/or CVM techniques to assess these additional potential benefits. 
Second, there may be option and/or existence values associated with 
farmland retention. Option values are those benefits derived from the 
knowledge of potential future availability of a resource (Weisbrod 
1967). Existence values, on the other hand , provide satisfaction bas-
ed not on actual or potential use, but solely on knowledge of the con-
tinued preservation of a unique resource (e.g., see Schulze et al. 1983 
and Brookshire et al. 1983). Given these additional potential benefits, 
this study's results may be a lower boundary. 
Conversely, it is not unreasonable to suspect that the estimates are 
biased upward by people overstating their true willingness to pay in 
this contingent market setting. If we assume that the benefits of a 
development rights purchase program are concentrated locally within 
the borough , knowledge that the costs of such an endeavor would be 
spread over all state residents would be an incentive to overstate one's 
true preference in order to increase the likelihood of the investment's 
being undertaken. Future studies could circumvent this problem by 
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limiting the payment vehicles to those specific to the local beneficiaries 
(e.g. , property tax increases) . However, as mentioned earlier in this 
study, adherence to a particular method of payment (vis-a-vis giving 
the respondent the option of various vehicles) may lead to payment 
vehicle bias. The existence of this bias can be tested, (e.g. , see Rowe 
et al. 1980 and Thayer 1981), therefore, future studies should ad-
dress this problem. 
Another issue of interest to public decision makers is that of distribu-
tional impacts. Individuals with higher incomes may express a higher 
WTP for a particular publicly provided good than those with lower 
incomes. Given this discrepency, governmental projects based solely 
on WTP may generate projects which provide disproportionately 
greater benefits for higher income groups (Dwyer et al. 1977) . In 
this study, distributional issues appear to be relatively unimportant. 
As was discussed earlier, income was an nonsignificant regressor on 
WTP, hence, there appears to be no tendency for wealthier individuals 
to influence the aggregate benefits more than those who are less 
wealthy. Furthermore, based on the results of the random sample, 
it is evident that support for retention of farmland-associated amenities 
is widespread in the borough. Since 80 per cent of the same 
respondents were nonzero bidders, approximately four-fifths of the 
local population can be expected to be willing to pay to prevent loss 
of such amenities. 
A final issue that merits attention concerns the all-or-none valua-
tions in this study. Given the nature of the resource in question and 
practical limitations imposed by the survey design, marginal valua-
tion was considered impracticable. This CVM study design was limited 
to three levels of residential housing development on farmlands 
(i.e. , Scenarios A, B, and C) . In each posited change 
(i.e. , WTP c-A , WTP n-A) bids were based on the retention of the en-
tire remaining Old Colony and Homestead area as farmland . Hence, 
the resulting investment analysis is an "ali-or-nothing" case. Unlike 
other CVM studies where the resource was such that provision is 
smoothly continuous and of a homogeneous nature, e.g., cubic feet 
of stream flow (Daubert and Young 1981) or miles of visibility (Schulze 
et al. 1983), these farmland-associated amenities are lumpy, 
heterogeneous, and site specific. This inherent characteristic of the 
nonmarket good makes straightforward marginal analysis more 
cumbersome in a hypothetical context. 
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One method that might be used to deal with the nonhomogeneous 
problem and to incorporate incremental valuations would be a 
"strategically" located, site-specific bidding-game design. With this 
approach, farmland units of relatively homogeneous scenic and en-
vironmental/historic quality would first be identified by the resear-
cher. Respondents could then bid incrementally on progressively larger 
acreage bundles providing the farmland-associated amenities. Future 
efforts in this area should, perhaps, use this approach. In this study, 
however, the site specific approach was deemed infeasible. Increas-
ed site specificity would have added considerably to the introductory 
background information required to conduct the bidding games. As 
a result, the time required to conduct a household interview would 
have increased substantially. Since the "boredom factor" (e.g. , see 
Schulze et a!. 1981) was an important consideration in development 
of the survey design, tedious descriptions of a number of specified 
farmland parcels could have led to biases and/or increased interview 
rejection rates. Given these interview related problems, the "all-or-
nothing" analysis was considered the most feasible approach , par-
ticularly for this initial effort. 
To conclude, the objectives of this study were twofold: 1) to apply 
CVM to a timely problem concerning an Alaskan agricultural lands 
and in doing so address the determinants of consumers' valuation; 
and, 2) to fill a public policy information gap concerning the social 
value of public actions aimed at retaining Old Colony and Homestead 
farmlands. First, several causal factors were shown to be influential 
in determining an individual's annual WTP for farmland-associated 
amenities. Severity of the loss of such amenities and knowledge of 
public efforts to retain local farmlands (vis-a-vis lack of such 
knowledge) were positive influences on WTP. On the other hand , 
an increase in a respondent's age and/or residence in the Wasilla area 
(vis-a-vis Palmer area) weigh negatively on WTP. 
Secondly, within the range of discount rates commonly used in 
public projects there would be sizeable net benefits accruing to borough 
residents from efforts to retain Old Colony and Homestead farmland. 
While efforts to retain these farmlands appear to be justifiable on 
grounds of economic feasibility, no assertions can be made, however, 
as to whether or not this is the best use of state monies. Conceivably, 
several public projects of comparable cost structures could prove 
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economically efficient (i.e., N P V s are greater than 0) , however, the 
most efficient use of public lands, ceteris paribus, would be the pro-
ject with the highest N P V. Comparisons of interproject net valua-
tions are left to Alaska's public decision-makers. 
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TIME/DATE: ___________ _ 
H.H . MEMBER: 
INTERVIEWER: 
(At the door) 
Hello, my name is . I'm from 
the Department of Economics at the University of Alaska , and I'm 
conducting a survey on land use in the Palmer/Wasilla area . Could 
I take a few minutes of your time to ask you some questions? 
(Inside) 
Before I begin the questionnaire, let me give you a little background 
information on what we're doing. I'm part of a team from the univer-
sity that is looking at land use issues in this area. This study is being 
funded by the State of Alaska. The survey is designed to look at some 
of the trade-offs between housing development, farming , and open 
space in the Palmer-Wasilla area. If you don't mind I'd like to ask 
you a few questions about your feelings on this subject. The answers 
you give are very important to this study and could help the state and 
local officials determine the type of surroundings that local residents 
would like to have. The survey takes about 20 minutes to do. Let me 
assure you that your answers will be held strictly confidential, and 
your name will not be associated with any of your responses . Are 
you ready to begin? 
If something is not clear or you have any questions, please feel free 
to stop me at any time. 
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Over the last several years a number of working farms in the 
Mata'!uska-Susitna Valley have been sold for housing development. 
Some people see this trend positively in that it has provided needed 
housing and economic growth using land that is already cleared and 
relatively easy to develop. Other people are in favor of local housing 
development, but would rather not see it occur on farmland. Finally, 
some people are opposed to all local housing development and would 
like to see things stay the way they are. 
I) Which of the following best describes your feelings about this trend? 
Are you . . . Question I 
a) in favor of housing development on 
local farmaland? a) 
b) in favor of housing development but 
not on local farmland? b) 
c) opposed to local housing develop-
ment in general? c) 
Much of this development activity has occurred in the Old Colony 
and Homestead areas. (Show map.) These areas are highlighted on 
the map. They include the Fairview Loop area, the Lazy Mountain 
area, the Palmer and Springer Loop area, and the Bodenberg Butte 
area. Within these areas, there are about IO,OOO acres of farmland 
under cultivation. Not only are these the most productive farms in 
the borough, but they also have historical and tourism significance. 
If housing development continues on local farmland, it could have 
a noticeable impact on the present open and rural nature of the valley. 
These photographs (show pictures) are designed to show typical types 
of development activity that could occur on the remaining farms in 
the Old Colony and Homestead areas. 
Situation A shows operating farms upon which there is no housing 
development. Note the open space and the absence of residential hous-
ing. This is meant to represent the current condition of the remain-
ing Old Colony and Homestead farmland. 
Situation B shows moderate levels of development where farming 
and re:~>iJenti<ti ltuu~>ing arc intermingled. Residential housing is now 








Finally, Situation C represents the maximum density of housing 
devebpment where farming is absent. Notice there is very little open 
space and residential housing now dominates the landscape. 
The next part of the survey is designed to determine whether or 
not you place value on preserving farmland in the Old Colony and 
Homestead areas. 
Usually people do not place dollar values on scenery, open space, 
or their surrounding environment, but such things are valuable to some 
people. Since it would cost money to keep farmland in its current 
state, I'd like to determine whether or not a rural farm environment 
is worth something to you in dollar terms. Consider, if you would , 
the possibility of residential housing development, such as Situations 
B and C (point to photographs) , occurring on all of the remaining 
Old Colony and Homestead farmland. 
Suppose the State and the Matanuska-Susitna Borough supported 
a program to preserve some of this local farmland. Farmers would 
be fully compensated for any loss of development opportunities and 
their participation would be strictly voluntary. Let's say two-thirds 
or approximately 7,000 acres could be preserved under this 
arrangement. 
There are basically three ways to fund such a program and to keep 
this land from being subdivided and developed. The first method would 
be an additional sales tax to be collected from all residents of the 
state. The second method would be an increase in property tax for 
all resident homeowners. Assume this tax would be passed on to anyone 
renting a dwelling also. The third method, a special fund , would be 
supported by private donations. 
Now if you will again focus upon the photographs showing the dif-
ferent levels of development. I would like to address the question of 
whether or not your household would be willing to pay to avoid the 
increased levels of development shown in Situations B and C. When 
you are deciding whether you are willing to pay, you will always be 
comparing a particular development level with the least-developed 
situation-Situation A. 
Again, Situation A is meant to show the operating farms that lie 
within the Old Colony and Homestead area. Situations Band Care 
possible future residential housing development that could occur on 
these same farms . 
44 
(Cover Situation C) 
2) Now compare Situations A and B (show photographs). Would your 
household be willing to pay in order to prevent the increased 
level of development in Situation B? Would you be willing to 
pay $25 per year to prevent Situation B from occurring? How 
about $50 per year? (Increment by $25 per year until a 
negative response, then decrease by $5 until a positive 
response; record amount.) 
Question 2 
$ ___ _ 
(Cover Situation B) 
3) Now look at Situation C. Would your household be willing to pay 
to prevent Situation C from occurring? Would you be willing 
to pay $25 per year? (Repeat bidding process.) 
Question 3 
$ ___ _ 
(If 'zero,' go to 3A) 
(If zero bid in Question 3, then ask Question 3A; otherwise skip to 
Question 4.) 
3A) We have found in studies like this that people have a lot of reasons 
for answering the way they did. Which of the following 
reasons best describe why you bid "zero"? You . 
Question 3A 
$ ___ _ 
a) didn't have enough information 
b) don't believe you can put a dollar value on your 
surroundings 
c) object to all the methods of payment mentioned. (Go to 
3B.) 
d) don't place value on preserving farmland 
e) or is there some other reason you can think of? 
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3B) (If respondent chose 3Ac) . 
Crn you think of a method you would support? 
If yes, repeat bidding game Question 2) and 3). 
4) Have you heard about the proposed legislation to buy development 






I have just a few more questions I'd like to ask you. Again, all your 
answers will be held strictly confidential. 
Question 5 
5) Sex : M __ _ F __ _ 
6) How long have you lived in the Matanuska-Susitna borough? 
7) What is your occupation? 
Question 6 
___ years 
(follow-up) Is your occupation related to agriculture? 
8) Are you the primary income earner in the family? 
Yes No 
Here is a list of education , age and income categories. (Hand respon-
dent card.) 
9) Please call off the code letter that corresponds to your level of 
education? 
Question 9 
10) Now the letter that corresponds to your age group? 
Question 10 
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11) And now the letter for your household income. 
Question 11 
(If respondent is reluctant: I understand your reluctance about giv-
ing this type of infOrmation, but let me reassure that there are no names 
associated with any of the surveys. Also, unless we have some idea 
of household income, we will be unable to use your responses in the 
study.) 
THANK YOU FOR PARTICIPATING IN THIS STUDY. 
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The University of Alaska-Fairbanks is an equal-opportunity educational institu-
tion and an affirmative-action employer. 
In order to simplify terminology, trade names of products or equipment may 
have been used in this publication. No endorsement of products or firms men-
tioned is intended, nor is criticism implied of those not mentioned. 
Material appearing herein may be reprinted provided no endorsement of a 
commercial product is stated or implied. Please credit the researchers involved 
and the Agricultural Experiment Station, University of Alaska-Fairbanks. 
